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1. Introduction
Baruch Lev has written a thoughtful response to
my commentary on policy recommendations for
intangibles. I am glad that my paper has generated
a response from Professor Lev, who is acknowl-
edged as perhaps the leading expert on this topic,
because I think the way we make progress on
questions such as this is to engage in dialogue.
Lev’s response does not change my views – I still
believe that the case in favour of intangibles re-
form is underwhelming. Rather than reiterating
points I have previously made, let me respond to
some of Professor Lev’s specific comments and
simply encourage the reader to read both pieces
carefully and reach their own conclusions.
2. The role of market incentives
Lev points out that one of the themes in my com-
mentary is a reliance on markets to solve financial
reporting problems. My response to this is that, to
paraphrase an old song, ‘if believing in markets is
wrong, I don’t want to be right.’ I am not repen-
tant; I do believe that markets work well most of
the time. In my article I provide a number of ex-
amples of how markets seem to work well in allo-
cating resources to intangibles-rich technology
companies, in spite of what Lev would charac-
terise as overly conservative accounting. The tech-
nology sector has boomed over the last couple of
decades, in spite of apparently being hamstrung by
the traditional financial reporting model. Lev does
not respond in detail to these arguments but rather
asks why we don’t allow markets to solve all of
our financial reporting problems. To some degree I
agree with what seems to be an extreme position.
After all, as Watts and Zimmerman (1983) pointed
out some time ago, there is evidence that audited
financial statements, in a form similar to what exist
today, have been used for hundreds of years, and
so easily predate any form of securities regulation.
My argument is also more complex than Lev’s
discussion implies. From an economic perspec-
tive, I do think there is a role for regulators such as
the FASB and the SEC. I agree with the position in
the Garten (2001) report that regulators can help
improve financial reporting for intangibles in at
least two ways. First, no single entity has incen-
tives to develop an overall disclosure framework
for intangibles. Yet it seems that developing such a
framework would be useful in standardising and
encouraging disclosure. Second, if we do agree
that firms should disclose more information about
intangibles (if we can somehow ascertain that the
market is supplying too small a quantity of intan-
gibles disclosures) perhaps we should lower the
costs of these disclosures. For example, if these
disclosures subject firms to legal risks, perhaps
some type of safe harbour can be utilised to en-
courage more disclosure, similar to what is already
done by the SEC in the area of forward-looking
statements.
3. Previous research on intangibles
Lev argues with my conclusion that there is no ev-
idence that current financial reporting require-
ments result in lower valuations for companies that
incur significant expenditures on research and de-
velopment (R&D) and other intangibles. His
claims here are again a bit too broad. Let me make
two points in response to what he has written.
First, I believe that it is not unreasonable to argue
that studies of apparent mispricing in securities
markets (i.e. of accounting anomalies) are difficult
to interpret; see, for example, Kothari’s (2001) re-
view of capital markets research. Without a well-
accepted model of expected returns, it is hard to
know for sure whether stocks that appear to earn
excess returns are truly undervalued or whether we
have failed to correctly account for risk in model-
ing expected returns. This is well-known and is not
controversial. Moreover, it is not correct to say, as
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Lev does, that ‘this criticism … can be levelled at
practically any market-based accounting or fi-
nance research.’ I think it is clear that I am only
talking about a particular class of studies. 
Second, Lev does not address an important part
of my argument. I argue that there is little evidence
that changing the way we currently account for
and report intangibles would change the capital
market effects described in these studies. For ex-
ample, in the US, R&D is transparently disclosed
to investors on the income statement. Given that
information about R&D is disclosed to investors,
how do we know that changing the way we ac-
count for it would affect capital market decisions?
Are we convinced that by capitalising R&D ex-
penditures (or some part thereof), capital markets
would somehow get it right? This seems to imply
that capital markets rely mechanically on the way
that accountants account for and report various
items, which is a conclusion that I see as fairly
controversial given extant evidence.
4. Growth in R&D and advertising
In my commentary, I plot aggregate real expendi-
tures on R&D, capital, and advertising to show
that aggregate R&D has grown significantly over
the past 20–30 years, and that this growth outstrips
that of capital expenditures, which are capitalised.
This seems inconsistent with critics’ claims that
accounting for intangibles (the immediate expens-
ing of R&D and advertising expenditures) has un-
duly handicapped investments in intangibles. Lev
responds by showing that R&D and advertising in-
tensities (expenditures deflated by sales) are basi-
cally flat, and argues that this instead is the right
metric. I have a couple of observations about this.
First, if we’re interested in drawing conclusions
about whether overall investment in intangibles is
somehow ‘too small’, it seems to me that the ag-
gregate numbers are of interest, similar to econo-
mists’ focus on GDP. Put differently, it is not clear
to me why we should be concerned that R&D as a
percentage of sales has stayed roughly constant
over time – perhaps this is the ‘correct’ level of
R&D spending by firms. Second, by deflating by
sales, the trend in these ratios will be affected by
changes in the underlying Compustat population.
Different industries naturally have different R&D
intensities, which makes trends in aggregate ratios
difficult to interpret.
5. What’s to be done?
Let me address two points that Lev makes in this
section. First, he agrees with those who point to
the fact that market-to-book ratios are ‘too high’ as
evidence that we should capitalise intangibles. My
response to this argument is that the role of the bal-
ance sheet is not to arrive at a book value that
tracks market value. I stand by this view even
though Lev points out that the FASB takes a bal-
ance sheet approach and so would be ‘surprised’
by my view. Perhaps, but I think I am in good
company in claiming that the balance sheet’s role
is not one of valuation (e.g. Holthausen and Watts,
2001). 
Second, he claims that there is a good deal of ev-
idence which supports his position that intangibles
should be capitalised. Without going into detail
about each of these studies, suffice to say that they
are principally of the ‘value relevance’ type. As is
discussed elsewhere (e.g. Holthausen and Watts,
2001; Skinner, 1996), there are good reasons why
drawing policy conclusions from this type of study
is problematic.
6. Postscript
Lev argues at a number of junctures that I make
overly-sweeping statements. Yet at the end of his
article he lays the blame for the NASDAQ tech
bubble, the Enron accounting scandal, and the re-
cent sub-prime financial crisis on our ‘outdated’
accounting model. While I could address each of
these claims more specifically, it seems to me rea-
sonable to simply observe that blaming the current
accounting model for all of these problems is a
rather sweeping conclusion.
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